

Quadrennial Defense Review

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The Department of Defense has adopted a capabilities-based approach to defense planning for transforming the U.S. military to meet newly emerging national security challenges. Capabilities-based planning focuses on developing the general wherewithal to fight successfully in a wide range of circumstances rather than only in stereotyped scenarios. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted what it called six specific operational goals for the focus of the transformation. It then sought metrics for evaluating, advancing, and monitoring progress in attaining those goals. This documented briefing contains the slides and text of a briefing that describes a first cut at identifying such metrics. The research reported here was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center (ATPC) as part of RAND's Metrics for the QDR Transformation Operational Goals project, a cross-cutting effort sponsored by the advisory board of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies. The research reported here was conducted in early 2002, and results were presented to NDRI's advisory board in April 2002. This documented briefing should be of interest to those involved in defense planning, particularly as it relates to transforming the U.S. armed forces.

This study shows RAND's review of the Joint Staff's participation in the QDR and shows recommendations to aid future reviews. Department of Defense's quadrennial defense review (QDR) : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, first session, October 4, 2001.

The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel American Strategy: Issues and Alternatives For the Quadrennial Defense Review

Quadrennial Defense Review 2001

Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, October 4, 2001

Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements : Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

The above quote, taken from Secretary of Defense William Cohen's cover letter that accompanied the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, might leave one with the impression that those responsible for that undertaking were driven by purely noble motives. Rather than accepting such a lofty notion at face value, we must probe more deeply to reveal the process at work during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This is especially appropriate since more than a year has passed since the completion of the QDR and the follow-on report by the National Defense Panel (NDP). We can now view the results with some perspective. In addition, lessons learned from the 1997 reviews can help guide the next review cycle, scheduled for 2001. While many in Congress may have held out high hopes that the QDR and NDP would produce meaningful recommendations for change to meet the nation's future security requirements, the results have been disappointing. This paper will seek to explain that the shortcomings in the products from the QDR and NDP were, perhaps predictably, largely a result of the bureaucratic structure of the process used to conduct these two much-publicized defense reviews. Furthermore, this paper will offer recommendations for an alternative structure for the next QDR to increase the freedom and independence of its operations. This will improve the chances that the next review will take a truly "fresh look" at defense and yield a more relevant report.

Takes a first cut at identifying metrics for evaluating, advancing, and monitoring progress toward attaining the six operational goals highlighted in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

"Every four years, by mandate of Congress, the Pentagon conducts the Quadrennial Defense Review, a complete re-evaluation of the nation's military strategy and forces. The 2005 QDR, the third such review, was published in February 2006. A QDR takes more than a year to finish. It generates intense interest, not only within the government but also among the popular news media and advocates and opponents of programs and causes that might be affected. No special authority is reserved for the QDR. Anything the QDR can do can also be done in between reviews by the regular process of government. For example, the Bush Administration's preemption strategy in June 2002 a landmark change in defense policy was implemented between QDRs. Nevertheless, the QDR is surrounded by an aura of great importance. This is partly because of the depth and breadth of the review and partly because of the attention that is focused on it. The QDR process, in existence for less than 10 years, is perceived as the venue in which key defense issues will be decided. The expectations often exceed what the QDR actually delivers. The QDR grew out of a recognition by Congress in the summer of 1996 that the defense program was seriously out of balance. The armed forces were not sized or funded to carry out the declared national strategy. The force was considerably smaller that it had been during the Cold War, but the operational tempo was higher. With the effects of inflation factored out, the defense budget had declined for 12 years in a row. The defense authorization act for Fiscal Year 1997 directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct and submit to Congress a Quadrennial Defense Review to "include a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the U.S. and establishing a revised defense program."--P. 7.

U.S. National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review
Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearing Held, March 14, 2006

Opportunities to Improve the Next Review : Report to Congressional Requesters

Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements Analyzing the Major Defense Review Process

The Department of Defense (DOD) is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget every 4 years including an assessment of the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in February 2006, represents the first comprehensive review that DOD had undertaken since the military forces have been engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO was asked to assess (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR and (2) what changes, if any, in the QDR legislation could improve the usefulness of the report, including any changes that would better reflect 21st century security conditions. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed DOD's methodology, QDR study guidance, and results from key analyses and also obtained views of defense analysts within and outside of DOD. DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had several strengths, but several weaknesses significantly limited the review's usefulness in addressing force structure, personnel requirements, and risk associated with executing the national defense strategy. Key strengths of the QDR included sustained involvement of senior DOD officials, extensive collaboration with interagency partners and allied countries, and a database to track implementation of initiatives. However, GAO found weaknesses in three key areas. First, DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated assessment of different options for organizing and sizing its forces to provide needed capabilities. Without such an assessment, DOD is not well positioned to balance capability needs and risks within future budgets, given the nation's fiscal challenges. Second, DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion that it had the appropriate number of personnel to meet current and projected demands. During its review, DOD did not consider changing personnel levels and instead focused on altering the skill mix. However, a year after the QDR report was issued, DOD announced plans to increase Army and Marine Corps personnel by 92,000. Without performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel it needs, DOD cannot provide an analytical basis that its military and civilian personnel levels reflect the number of personnel needed to execute the defense strategy. Third, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are required by the QDR legislation, did not fully apply DOD's risk management framework because DOD had not developed assessment tools to measure risk. Without a sound analytical approach to assessing risk, DOD may not be able to demonstrate how it will manage risk within current and expected resource levels. As a result, DOD is not in the best position to demonstrate that it has identified the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate risk. Through discussions with DOD officials and defense analysts, GAO has identified several options for refining the QDR legislative language that Congress could consider to improve the usefulness of future QDRs, including changes to encourage DOD to focus on high priority strategic issues and better reflect security conditions of the 21st century. Congress could consider options to clarify its expectations regarding what budget information DOD should include in the QDR and eliminate reporting elements for issues that could be addressed in different reports. For example, the requirement to assess revisions to the unified command plan is also required and reported under other legislation. Further, some reporting elements such as how resources would be shifted between two conflicts could be eliminated in light of DOD's new planning approach that focuses on capabilities to meet a range of threats rather than on the allocation of forces for specific adversaries. GAO also presents an option to have an advisory group work with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide DOD with alternative perspectives and analyses.

As an After-action report, this documented briefing summarizes analysis performed for the Joint Staff in preparation for and in support of the second Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR). The authors concluded that QDR 2001 like QDR 1997, was useful in providing information on requirements for military capabilities and resource. The report recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff use existing processes to routinely address cross-cutting issues from a military perspective. Congress mandated that every 4 years the Dept. of Defense (DoD) conduct a review to examine the national defense strategy and its implications for force structure, modernization, infrastructure and the budget. Because the 2001 review, which was issued on Sept. 30, 2001, will have a significant impact on the DoD's planning and budget, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to assess: (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DoD's conduct and reporting of the review, and (2) whether changes in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) legislation could improve the usefulness of future reviews. Charts and tables.

Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review Background, Process, and Issues Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, Hearing Held June 21, 2001

A Retrospective Look at Joint Staff Participation This paper was prepared to present an approach to managing Joint Staff preparations for the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2001), which we developed in working with the staff of the Studies and Analysis Management Division (SAMD) of the Joint Staff G-8). The lessons learned from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 1997) included the need for leadership guidance and integration of analytic activities to sort through the myriad issues that are always confronting the Department of Defense. The "Goldwater-Nichols" legislative changes to Title X statutes expanded the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and tasked him with the formal responsibilities of reviewing and commenting on defense matters that require analytic support as well as military judgment. The J-8 should assist the Chairman by managing a process that can provide credible and timely analysis to support high-level review of important issues.

Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit from Better Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope

The Department of Defense (DOD) is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget every 4 years including an assessment of the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in February 2006, represents the first comprehensive review that DOD had undertaken since the military forces have been engaged in

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Goals and Principles : Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held, September 14, 2005

Independent Panel's Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review

Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

In the Wake of the QDR Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, Hearing Held April 15, 2010

The National Security Strategy outlines an ambitious military plan that focuses on transforming and maintaining a Force strength sufficient to dissuade potential adversaries while providing the President a wider range of military options. The Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledges the Department of Defense's responsibility in providing these options to the President as part of its Paradigm Shift in Force Planning. To underwrite its new force-sizing construct the Department of Defense mandate is to maintain sufficient force generation capability and a Strategic Reserve to mitigate risks. Regrettably, the Quadrennial Defense Review fails to articulate the feasibility of how it plans to organize, resource, equip, and employ the Strategic Reserve that is so critically linked to America's national defense. Adjunct to the Quadrennial Defense Review's treatment of the Strategic Reserve is the Army's Vision and how it defines its role in the defense of the National Military Strategy. The Army's vision and role are underscored by a three-prong approach; people, readiness, and transformation. Specifically within the element of Readiness the main objective is to fully integrate the Active and Reserve Component forces. This "seamless" integration, while highly

desirable to meet current operational requirements, directly impacts and impairs the effective employment of the Army Reserve Component in support of its mandate to provide a Strategic Reserve capability as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report. The purpose of this research project is to address the Quadrennial Defense Review's failure to realistically provide a viable strategy for the employment of the Strategic Reserve in support of the National Security Strategy, and to refute the feasibility of the Army's capacity to provide a ready and relevant force capable of serving as the Nation's Strategic Reserve.

The Quadrennial Defense Review : process, policy, and perspectives : hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, hearing held February 26, 2013.

Provides an overview of the Quadrennial Defense Review, a legislatively mandated assessment of defence strategy, force structure, weapons programs, and operations designed to guide defence programming, operational planning, and budgets.

Process, Policy, and Perspectives : Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held February 26, 2013

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: Opportunities to Improve the Next Review

The Quadrennial Defense Review

Assessing U.S. Defense and Security

Quadrennial defense review report [electronic resource].

The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of profound change in the international arena and hence in the policymaking environment as well. Yet the changes that have characterized the post-Cold War era have often proceeded at different paces and have at times moved in opposing directions, placing unprecedented strain on policymakers seeking to shape a new national security and military strategy. This report describes the challenges policymakers have faced as seen through the lens of the three major force structure reviews that have taken place over the past decade: the 1990 Base Force, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. The report focuses on the assumptions, decisions, and outcomes associated with these reviews as well as the planning and execution of each. It concludes that all three reviews fell short of fully apprehending the demands of the emerging threat environment, and the budgets that would be needed and afforded, resulting in a growing imbalance between strategy, forces, and resources over the decade. Accordingly, the report recommends that future defense planners adopt an assumption-based approach in which key planning assumptions are continually reassessed with a view toward recognizing--and rapidly responding to--emerging gaps and shortfalls.

Every five years, DoD prepares a review of global defense capabilities extending to 2005 & beyond. This review focuses on the adjustment of forces to reflect the demise of the Warsaw Pact, reductions in DoD infrastructure, a service focus, & other changes. Contents: design, approach, & implementation of the Quadrennial Defense Review; the global security environment; defense strategy; alternative defense postures; forces & manpower; force readiness; transforming U.S. forces for the future; achieving a 21st century defense infrastructure; comments by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Glossary. Assessment by the Nat. Defense Panel.

In its May 1995 report, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces recommended that DOD lead a comprehensive strategy and force review at the start of each new administration. In August 1995, the Secretary of Defense endorsed performing a quadrennial review of the defense program. Congress, noting the Secretary's intent to complete the first such review in 1997, required in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 that DOD report on a number of topics, including the defense strategy; the force structure best suited to implement the strategy; the effect of new technologies anticipated by 2005 on force structure, doctrine, and operational concepts; and key assumptions used in the review. It also authorized a National Defense Panel, comprising national security experts from the private sector, to review the results of the QDR and conduct a subsequent study to identify and assess force alternatives. DOD completed the QDR in May 1997 and the Panel issued its report in December 1997.

Managing Quadrennial Defense Review Integration

Managing Quadrennial Defense Review Integration: An Overview Process, Policy, and Perspectives

An Overview

The Quadrennial Defense Review and Its Consequences

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication.

The DoD is facing the complex challenge of simultaneously supporting continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and preparing its military forces to meet emerging threats of the new security environment. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) articulates DoD's strategic plan to rebalance capabilities in order to prevail in current operations and develop capabilities to meet future threats. The QDR acknowledged that the country faces fiscal challenges and that DoD must make difficult trade-offs where warranted. This report provides an assessment of the degree to which DoD addressed each of these items in its 2010 report on the QDR and the supplemental information provided to the defense committees. Charts and tables.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget

every 4 years, including an assessment of the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in February 2006, represents the first comprehensive review that DoD has undertaken since U.S. military forces have been engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO was asked to assess the following: (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DoD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR; and (2) what changes, if any, in the QDR legislation could improve the usefulness of the report, including any changes that would better reflect 21st century security conditions. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed DoD's methodology, QDR study guidance, and results from key analyses and also obtained the views of defense analysts within and outside of DoD. GAO recommends that for future QDRs, DoD develop methods to conduct a more thorough analysis of force structure and risk. GAO is also providing options for Congress to consider to revise QDR legislation. DoD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.

The problems and issues that the research team tracked during QDR 1997 are far from being resolved and there is no clear guidance on what will be demanded in QDR 2001. The services remain skeptical of the Joint Staff dealing with tough issues that could redirect their own programmatic decisions. Although there is promise of improvement in organization and process, the most glaring problems are the lack of a comprehensive approach to treating resources and understanding the effects of resources on strategy and transformation alternatives. It is essential that good working relationships be established now with a clear understanding of the different responsibilities and capabilities of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). It will be important to identify an appropriate set of mega-issues (with an appropriate set of supporting specific issues) and initiate studies and analysis on the most important ones.

Future Reviews Can Benefit from Better Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope

Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review

Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Could benefit from Improved Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements

Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review

Some Personnel Cuts and Associated Savings May Not be Achieved : Report to Congressional Requesters

The report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, second session, August 3, 2010.

Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review

Lessons on Managing Change in the Department of Defense

Quadrennial defense review some personnel cuts and associated savings may not be achieved : report to congressional requesters

Defense Planning in a Decade of Change

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis